Haitian-Cuban Policy, 1991-2021

“Between 1991 and 1994, over 67,000 Haitians were interdicted at sea. Interdiction, detention, and deportation became the cornerstones of U.S. policy towards Haitian asylum seekers during this period.”

On July 13, 2021, the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, announced that Haitians and Cubans who tried to reach the United States without authorization would be denied entry, regardless of the legitimacy of their asylum claims. In making this announcement, members of the Biden administration were aware of history. During the early 1990s—, during another period of political upheaval in Haiti and Cuba—, maritime migration from both countries increased dramatically, forcing the Bush and Clinton administrations to adjust their asylum policies ad hoc. Three decades later, the Biden administration anticipates—and is trying to preempt—another large migration from Haiti and Cuba, but will likely find it equally difficult to deter asylum-seekers.

There are similarities between 1991 and 2021. In September 1991, a military junta removed the democratically-elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. A violent repression of the civilian populace followed, prompting a large-scale migration by boat. Within months of the coup, the U.S. Coast Guard had picked up over thirty thousand Haitians at sea. The George H.W. Bush administration tried to discourage the dangerous sea journeys through broadcasts in Creole on Voice of America. The administration also established an “in-country” registration center to facilitate a more orderly departure for a select number of carefully chosen refugees. When these efforts failed to reduce the number of asylum seekers, the Bush administration issued the Kennebunkport order on May 24, 1992, establishing its policy of interdiction: the U.S. Coast Guard apprehended Haitians at sea and either returned them to Haiti or transported them to the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo, Cuba. If Haitians failed to make a case for asylum at Guantánamo, they were detained indefinitely until they agreed to return home or were accepted by another country.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies criticized Bush’s interdiction policy but public opinion polls showed that over half of Americans supported it. Bill Clinton, who had criticized the policy while on the campaign trail, also adopted interdiction once he became president. Between 1991 and 1994, over 67,000 Haitians were interdicted at sea. Interdiction, detention, and deportation became the cornerstones of U.S. policy towards Haitian asylum seekers during this period.

Like Haiti, Cuba also experienced turmoil during the early 1990s. The dismantling of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc provoked the worst economic crisis of Fidel Castro’s government. After a series of anti-government demonstrations in Havana turned violent, Castro announced on August 13, 1994 that his government would no longer put obstacles in the way of people who wished to leave the island. Soon after, tens of thousands of Cubans set sail for the U.S. on homemade rafts.

Anticipating another Mariel Boatlift (1980), the Clinton administration instructed the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept the Cuban balseros (“rafters”) and transport them to Guantánamo where they would have to remain until they requested repatriation to Cuba or sought immigration to a third country. In the case of the Cubans, this was a stunning reversal in policy. Cubans had long been beneficiaries of a parole, refugee, and asylum policy that privileged those who fled communist states; those who entered the U.S. without authorization were generally allowed to stay. When Clinton’s announcement failed to discourage the boat traffic from Cuba, the administration increased its economic pressure on the Castro government, severing one of the Castro government’s remaining economic lifelines by prohibiting Cuban Americans from sending remittances to their relatives on the island. The boat traffic continued, however.

Diplomatic representatives from Cuba and the U.S. eventually resolved the crisis. Under the terms of the new accords, the Cuban government agreed to actively discourage boat traffic to the U.S., and the U.S. agreed to admit up to 20,000 Cuban immigrants per year. After assurances of non-retaliation from the Cuban government, over 1,000 Cuban detainees at Guantánamo agreed to return to their homeland, but more than 20,000 chose to stay in Guantánamo. Over the next eighteen months, the Clinton administration tried to negotiate the Cubans’ migration to a third country, with limited success. To appease the vocal and influential Cuban American lobby, the administration eventually—and quietly—paroled 21,000 Cuban detainees into the U.S.

In the wake of the US-Cuba immigration accords, U.S. policy toward unauthorized Cuban migration became known as the “wet foot/dry foot” policy: Cubans interdicted at sea were regarded to have “wet feet” and were returned to Cuba unless interviews aboard the Coast Guard vessels demonstrated a credible asylum claim that warranted a full asylum hearing in the U.S. Those who escaped interdiction and landed on U.S. soil were said to have “dry feet” and were offered a one-year extendable parole, after which they could apply for permanent residency. “Wet foot/dry foot” remained U.S. policy toward Cuban migrants until 2015 when, on the eve of the normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Obama administration announced its termination. Henceforth, those who entered the U.S. without authorization and who did not qualify for humanitarian relief were subject to removal. “By taking this step,” said the president, “we are treating Cuban migrants the same way we treat migrants from other countries.”

Is the Biden policy a radical departure from historical precedent? The U.S. has a long tradition of deterring Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers but—yes—the policy is a departure: denying entrance to those who have established a credible fear of persecution, and referring them to third countries instead, is a departure from U.S. asylum policy and a violation of international norms regarding asylum. How Biden’s policy will play out in the months to come has yet to be seen, however. As Bush and Clinton discovered, the best laid plans must be adjusted. At this writing, the anticipated mass migration from Haiti and Cuba has yet to materialize.